Article 8(1) and Article 17(1) of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009,

must be interpreted as precluding, where the competent judicial authority of the executing State has refused, under Article 4(6) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, to execute a European arrest warrant issued by the competent judicial authority of the issuing State for the purposes of enforcing a custodial sentence and the competent judicial authority of the executing State has undertaken to enforce that sentence, another competent judicial authority of the executing State from subsequently suspending, under its national law, the enforcement of that sentence.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which authorises the public authority responsible for the protection of copyright and related rights against infringements of those rights committed on the internet to access data, retained by providers of publicly available electronic communications services, relating to the civil identity associated with IP addresses previously collected by rightholder organisations, so that that authority can identify the holders of those addresses – which have been used for activities liable to constitute such infringements – and may, where appropriate, take measures against them, provided that, under that legislation:

– those data are retained in conditions and in accordance with technical arrangements which ensure that the possibility that that retention might allow precise conclusions to be drawn about the private life of those IP address holders, for example by establishing a detailed profile of those persons, is ruled out – which may be accomplished, in particular, by imposing on providers of electronic communications services an obligation to retain the various categories of personal data, such as data relating to civil identity, IP addresses and traffic and location data, in such a way as to ensure a genuinely watertight separation of those different categories of data, thereby preventing, at the retention stage, any combined use of those different categories of data – and for a period not exceeding what is strictly necessary;

– that public authority's access to such data retained separately and in a genuinely watertight manner serves exclusively to identify the person suspected of having committed a criminal offence and is subject to the necessary safeguards to ensure that that access cannot, except in atypical situations, allow precise conclusions to be drawn about the private life of the IP address holders, for example by establishing a detailed profile of those persons, which entails, in particular, that the officials of that authority authorised to have such access are prohibited from disclosing, in any form whatsoever, information on the content of the files consulted by those holders, except for the sole purpose of referring the matter to the public prosecution service, from tracking the clickstream of those IP address holders and, more generally, from using those IP addresses for any purpose other than that of identifying their holders with a view to the potential adoption of measures against them;

– the possibility, for the persons responsible for examining the facts within that public authority, of linking such data with files containing information that reveals the title of protected works the making available of which on the internet justified the collection of IP addresses by rightholder organisations is subject, in cases where the same person again repeats an activity infringing copyright or related rights, to review by a court or an independent administrative body, which cannot be entirely automated and must take place before any such linking, as such linking is capable, in such circumstances, of enabling precise conclusions to be drawn about the private life of the person whose IP address has been used for activities that may infringe copyright or related rights;

– the data processing system used by the public authority is subject at regular intervals to a review, by an independent body acting as a third party in relation to that public authority, intended to verify the integrity of the system, including the effective safeguards against the risks of abusive or unlawful access to or use of those data, and its effectiveness and reliability in detecting potential offending conduct.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as not precluding a national provision which requires a national court, acting in the context of a prior review carried out following a reasoned request for access to a set of traffic or location data – which are liable to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private life of a user of a means of electronic communication and retained by providers of electronic communications services – submitted by a competent national authority in the context of a criminal investigation, to authorise such access if it is requested for the purposes of investigating criminal offences punishable under national law by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least three years, provided that there is sufficient evidence of the commission of such offences and that those data are relevant to establishing the facts, on condition, however, that that court is entitled to refuse such access if it is requested in the context of an investigation into an offence which is manifestly not a serious offence, in the light of the societal conditions prevailing in the Member State concerned.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as precluding the use, in connection with investigations into corruption-related misconduct in office, of personal data relating to electronic communications which have been retained, pursuant to a legislative measure adopted under that provision, by providers of electronic communications services and which have subsequently been made available, pursuant to that measure, to the competent authorities for the purpose of combating serious crime.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as meaning that:

it precludes national legislative measures which provide, on a preventative basis, for the purposes of combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data;

it does not preclude legislative measures that:

– allow, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain, generally and indiscriminately, traffic and location data in situations where the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, where the decision imposing such an instruction is subject to effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that one of those situations exists and that the conditions and safeguards which must be laid down are observed, and where that instruction may be given only for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended if that threat persists;

– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating crime and safeguarding public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems;

– allow, for the purposes of combating serious crime and, a fortiori, safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.

1. Article 12(2)(a) and (d) of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) and Article 23(2)(g) and (h) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6 and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, read in conjunction with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, and read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, as a preventive measure, in order to combat market abuse offences including insider dealing, provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data for a year from the date on which they were recorded.

1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, as a preventive measure for the purposes of combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data. However, that Article 15(1), read in the light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not preclude legislative measures that provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for

– the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

– the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

– the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems; and

– recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.

2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which the centralised processing of requests for access to data, which have been retained by providers of electronic communications services, issued by the police in the context of the investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences, is the responsibility of a police officer, who is assisted by a unit established within the police service which has a degree of autonomy in the exercise of its duties, and whose decisions may subsequently be subject to judicial review.

1. Article 1(1) and Article 8(1)(c) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that a European arrest warrant may be issued on the basis of a judicial decision of the issuing Member State ordering the execution, in that Member State, of a sentence imposed by a court of a third State where, pursuant to a bilateral agreement between those States, the judgment in question has been recognised by a decision of a court of the issuing Member State. However, the issuing of the European arrest warrant is subject to the condition, first, that a custodial sentence of at least four months has been imposed on the requested person and, second, that the procedure leading to the adoption in the third State of the judgment recognised subsequently in the issuing Member State has complied with fundamental rights and, in particular, the obligations arising under Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Article 8(1)(c) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the case-law of the Court, must be interpreted as meaning that the requirements inherent in the effective judicial protection that must be afforded to a person who is the subject of a European arrest warrant for the purpose of criminal prosecution are not satisfied where both the European arrest warrant and the judicial decision on which that warrant is based are issued by a public prosecutor – who may be classified as an 'issuing judicial authority ' within the meaning of Article 6(1) of that framework decision – but cannot be reviewed by a court in the issuing Member State prior to the surrender of the requested person by the executing Member State.

Bonichot

Silva de Lapuerta

Bay Larsen

Toader

Jääskinen

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 March 2021.

A. Calot Escobar

Registrar

J.-C. Bonichot

President of the First Chamber

1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that permits public authorities to have access to a set of traffic or location data, that are liable to provide information regarding the communications made by a user of a means of electronic communication or regarding the location of the terminal equipment which he or she uses and to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning his or her private life, for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, without such access being confined to procedures and proceedings to combat serious crime or prevent serious threats to public security, and that is so regardless of the length of the period in respect of which access to those data is sought and the quantity or nature of the data available in respect of such a period.

2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that confers upon the public prosecutor's office, whose task is to direct the criminal pre-trial procedure and to bring, where appropriate, the public prosecution in subsequent proceedings, the power to authorise access of a public authority to traffic and location data for the purposes of a criminal investigation.

2. Article 8(1)(c) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, must be interpreted as meaning that a European arrest warrant must be regarded as invalid where it is not based on a '[national] arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect' for the purposes of that provision. That concept covers national measures adopted by a judicial authority to search for and arrest a person who is the subject of a criminal prosecution, with a view to bringing that person before a court for the purpose of conducting the stages of the criminal proceedings. It is for the referring court to determine whether a national measure putting a person under investigation, such as that on which the European arrest warrant at issue in the main proceedings is based, produces such legal effects.

3. Where no provision is made in the legislation of the issuing Member State for an action to be brought before a court for the purpose of obtaining review of the conditions under which a European arrest warrant was issued by an authority which, whilst participating in the administration of justice in that Member State, is not itself a court, Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as permitting the national court hearing an action seeking to challenge the lawfulness of the continued pre-trial detention of a person who has been surrendered pursuant to a European arrest warrant issued on the basis of a national measure that cannot be regarded as a '[national] arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect' for the purposes of Article 8(1)(c) of that framework decision, and in the context of which a plea in law is raised alleging that that European arrest warrant is invalid in the light of EU law, to find that it has jurisdiction to conduct such a review of validity.

Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as not requiring the effect of a finding by the national court that the European arrest warrant at issue has been issued in breach of Article 8(1)(c) of that framework decision, in so far as it is not based on a '[national] arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect' for the purposes of that provision, to be the release of the person placed in pre-trial detention following his or her surrender by the executing Member State to the issuing Member State. It is therefore for the referring court to decide, in accordance with its national law, what consequences the absence of such a national measure, as a legal basis for the European arrest warrant at issue, may have on deciding whether or not to keep the accused person in pre-trial detention.

Article 4a of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that the executing judicial authority may not refuse to execute a European arrest warrant issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence or a detention order, where the person concerned has prevented the service of a summons on him in person and did not appear in person at the trial because he had absconded to the executing Member State, on the sole ground that that authority has not been given the assurance that, if the person is surrendered to the issuing Member State, the right to a new trial, as defined in Articles 8 and 9 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, will be respected.

National legislation cannot allow a State authority to require providers of electronic communications services to make a general and indiscriminate transmission of traffic and location data to the security and intelligence agencies, even for safeguarding national security.

1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, for the purposes laid down in Article 15(1), provide, as a preventive measure, for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data. By contrast, Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not preclude legislative measures that:

- allow, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain, generally and indiscriminately, traffic and location data in situations where the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, where the decision imposing such an instruction is subject to effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that one of those situations exists and that the conditions and safeguards which must be laid down are observed, and where that instruction may be given only for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended if that threat persists;

- provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

- provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an Internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

- provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating crime and safeguarding public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems;

- allow, for the purposes of combating serious crime and, a fortiori, safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.

2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as not precluding national rules which requires providers of electronic communications services to have recourse, first, to the automated analysis and real-time collection, inter alia, of traffic and location data and, second, to the real-time collection of technical data concerning the location of the terminal equipment used, where:

- recourse to automated analysis is limited to situations in which a Member State is facing a serious threat to national security which is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, and where recourse to such analysis may be the subject of an effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that a situation justifying that measure exists and that the conditions and safeguards that must be laid down are observed; and where

- recourse to the real-time collection of traffic and location data is limited to persons in respect of whom there is a valid reason to suspect that they are involved in one way or another in terrorist activities and is subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding in order to ensure that such real-time collection is authorised only within the limits of what is strictly necessary. In cases of duly justified urgency, the review must take place within a short time.

3. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce'), must be interpreted as not being applicable in the field of the protection of the confidentiality of communications and of natural persons as regards the processing of personal data in the context of information society services, such protection being governed by Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, or by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, as appropriate. Article 23(1) of Regulation 2016/679, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires that providers of access to online public communication services and hosting service providers retain, generally and indiscriminately, inter alia, personal data relating to those services.

4. A national court may not apply a provision of national law empowering it to limit the temporal effects of a declaration of illegality, which it is bound to make under that law, in respect of national legislation imposing on providers of electronic communications services - with a view to, inter alia, safeguarding national security and combating crime - an obligation requiring the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data that is incompatible with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 15(1), interpreted in the light of the principle of effectiveness, requires national criminal courts to disregard information and evidence obtained by means of the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data in breach of EU law, in the context of criminal proceedings against persons suspected of having committed criminal offences, where those persons are not in a position to comment effectively on that information and that evidence and they pertain to a field of which the judges have no knowledge and are likely to have a preponderant influence on the findings of fact.

Where execution of a European arrest warrant issued for criminal proceedings is made subject to the condition in Article 5(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, the executing Member State may adapt the duration of the custodial sentence or detention order imposed in the issuing Member State only within the strict conditions in Article 8(2) of Framework Decision 2008/909.

Article 8(1)(f) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that failure to indicate, in the European arrest warrant pursuant to which the person concerned has been surrendered, an additional sentence of conditional release which was imposed on that person for the same offence in the same judicial decision as that relating to the main custodial sentence does not, on the facts of the case in the main proceedings, preclude the enforcement of that additional sentence, on the expiry of the main sentence after an express decision to that effect is taken by the national court with jurisdiction for the enforcement of sentences, from resulting in deprivation of liberty.

Access by public authorities to data identifying the owners of SIM cards activated with a stolen mobile telephone — such as surnames, forenames and, if need be, addresses — interferes with the fundamental rights protected by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, but that interference is not serious enough to require, in the field of preventing, investigating, detecting and prosecuting criminal offences, that such access be limited to fighting serious crime.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136 and read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, precludes national legislation that, for the purpose of fighting crime, requires the general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users for all means of electronic communication.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136 and read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, precludes national legislation on the protection and security of traffic and location data, and in particular on access by the competent national authorities to retained data, where all of the following apply: the objective of that access, in the context of fighting crime, is not limited solely to fighting serious crime; access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority; and the data concerned need not be retained within the European Union.

A public prosecutor’s office confirmation, in criminal proceedings, of a national arrest warrant previously issued by a police service is a “judicial decision” within the meaning of Article 8(1)(c).

In Article 8(1)(c) of Framework Decision 2002/584, the term 'arrest warrant' means a national arrest warrant that is separate from the European arrest warrant.

The executing judicial authority must refuse to give effect to a European arrest warrant that relies on an 'arrest warrant' within the meaning of Article 8(1)(c) but does not refer to any national arrest warrant, if — in light of the information provided under Article 15(2) and any other available information — it concludes that the European arrest warrant is not valid because it was issued without a national warrant separate from the European arrest warrant.

Directives 2002/58 and 2004/48 do not prevent national legislation such as that at issue if it allows the national court hearing an application, made by a person entitled to act, for disclosure of personal data to weigh the conflicting interests involved on the facts of each case, while giving due weight to the requirements of proportionality.