1. Article 1(3) and Article 15(1) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009,

must be interpreted as meaning that the executing authority of a Member State is not obliged to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant where the executing authority of another Member State has previously refused to execute that arrest warrant on the ground that the surrender of the person concerned may infringe the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Nevertheless, within the framework of its own examination of the existence of a ground for non-execution, that authority must give due consideration to the reasons underlying the refusal decision adopted by the first executing authority. Those provisions do not preclude, in the same circumstances, the issuing judicial authority from maintaining the European arrest warrant in question, provided that, according to its own assessment, execution of that arrest warrant should not be refused on the ground of a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and that it is proportionate to maintain that warrant.

6. Article 1(3) and Article 15(2) and (3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the principle of mutual trust,

must be interpreted as meaning that when examining detention conditions in the issuing Member State, the executing judicial authority cannot refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on the basis of information concerning the detention conditions in prisons in the issuing Member State which it has obtained itself, and in respect of which it has not requested supplementary information from the issuing judicial authority. The executing judicial authority cannot apply a higher standard as regards detention conditions than that guaranteed by Article 4 of the Charter.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), read in the light of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as not precluding provisions of national law which require that a judicial decision authorising listening, tapping and storage in respect of communications, without the consent of the users concerned, must itself contain an express statement of reasons in writing, irrespective of the existence of a reasoned application made by the criminal authorities.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which authorises the public authority responsible for the protection of copyright and related rights against infringements of those rights committed on the internet to access data, retained by providers of publicly available electronic communications services, relating to the civil identity associated with IP addresses previously collected by rightholder organisations, so that that authority can identify the holders of those addresses – which have been used for activities liable to constitute such infringements – and may, where appropriate, take measures against them, provided that, under that legislation:

– those data are retained in conditions and in accordance with technical arrangements which ensure that the possibility that that retention might allow precise conclusions to be drawn about the private life of those IP address holders, for example by establishing a detailed profile of those persons, is ruled out – which may be accomplished, in particular, by imposing on providers of electronic communications services an obligation to retain the various categories of personal data, such as data relating to civil identity, IP addresses and traffic and location data, in such a way as to ensure a genuinely watertight separation of those different categories of data, thereby preventing, at the retention stage, any combined use of those different categories of data – and for a period not exceeding what is strictly necessary;

– that public authority's access to such data retained separately and in a genuinely watertight manner serves exclusively to identify the person suspected of having committed a criminal offence and is subject to the necessary safeguards to ensure that that access cannot, except in atypical situations, allow precise conclusions to be drawn about the private life of the IP address holders, for example by establishing a detailed profile of those persons, which entails, in particular, that the officials of that authority authorised to have such access are prohibited from disclosing, in any form whatsoever, information on the content of the files consulted by those holders, except for the sole purpose of referring the matter to the public prosecution service, from tracking the clickstream of those IP address holders and, more generally, from using those IP addresses for any purpose other than that of identifying their holders with a view to the potential adoption of measures against them;

– the possibility, for the persons responsible for examining the facts within that public authority, of linking such data with files containing information that reveals the title of protected works the making available of which on the internet justified the collection of IP addresses by rightholder organisations is subject, in cases where the same person again repeats an activity infringing copyright or related rights, to review by a court or an independent administrative body, which cannot be entirely automated and must take place before any such linking, as such linking is capable, in such circumstances, of enabling precise conclusions to be drawn about the private life of the person whose IP address has been used for activities that may infringe copyright or related rights;

– the data processing system used by the public authority is subject at regular intervals to a review, by an independent body acting as a third party in relation to that public authority, intended to verify the integrity of the system, including the effective safeguards against the risks of abusive or unlawful access to or use of those data, and its effectiveness and reliability in detecting potential offending conduct.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as not precluding a national provision which requires a national court, acting in the context of a prior review carried out following a reasoned request for access to a set of traffic or location data – which are liable to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private life of a user of a means of electronic communication and retained by providers of electronic communications services – submitted by a competent national authority in the context of a criminal investigation, to authorise such access if it is requested for the purposes of investigating criminal offences punishable under national law by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least three years, provided that there is sufficient evidence of the commission of such offences and that those data are relevant to establishing the facts, on condition, however, that that court is entitled to refuse such access if it is requested in the context of an investigation into an offence which is manifestly not a serious offence, in the light of the societal conditions prevailing in the Member State concerned.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as precluding the use, in connection with investigations into corruption-related misconduct in office, of personal data relating to electronic communications which have been retained, pursuant to a legislative measure adopted under that provision, by providers of electronic communications services and which have subsequently been made available, pursuant to that measure, to the competent authorities for the purpose of combating serious crime.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) read in the light of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

is to be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a national practice under which judicial decisions authorising the use of special investigative methods following a reasoned and detailed application from the criminal authorities, are drawn up by means of a pre-drafted text which does not contain individualised reasons, but which merely states, in addition to the validity period of the authorisation, that the requirements laid down by the legislation to which those decisions refer have been complied with, provided that the precise reasons why the court with jurisdiction considered that the legal requirements had been complied with, in the light of the factual and legal circumstances characterising the case in question, can be easily and unambiguously inferred from a cross-reading of the decision and the application for authorisation, the latter of which must be made accessible, after the authorisation has been given, to the person against whom the use of special investigative methods has been authorised.

5. Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299,

must be interpreted as precluding the executing judicial authority from refusing to execute a European arrest warrant on the ground that the person for whom that warrant has been issued is at risk, following his or her surrender to the issuing Member State, of being tried by a court lacking jurisdiction for that purpose, without having first requested that the issuing judicial authority provide supplementary information.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as meaning that:

it precludes national legislative measures which provide, on a preventative basis, for the purposes of combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data;

it does not preclude legislative measures that:

– allow, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain, generally and indiscriminately, traffic and location data in situations where the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, where the decision imposing such an instruction is subject to effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that one of those situations exists and that the conditions and safeguards which must be laid down are observed, and where that instruction may be given only for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended if that threat persists;

– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

– provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating crime and safeguarding public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems;

– allow, for the purposes of combating serious crime and, a fortiori, safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.

1. Article 12(2)(a) and (d) of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) and Article 23(2)(g) and (h) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6 and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, read in conjunction with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, and read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, as a preventive measure, in order to combat market abuse offences including insider dealing, provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data for a year from the date on which they were recorded.

2. European Union law must be interpreted as precluding a national court from restricting the temporal effects of a declaration of invalidity which it is required to make, under national law, with respect to provisions of national law which, first, require operators providing electronic communications services to retain generally and indiscriminately traffic data and, second, allow such data to be submitted to the competent financial authority, without prior authorisation from a court or independent administrative authority, owing to the incompatibility of those provisions with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to provisions of national law that are incompatible with EU law is, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, a matter for national law, subject to compliance, inter alia, with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

1. Article 23(3) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of force majeure does not extend to legal obstacles to surrender which arise from legal actions brought by the person who is the subject of the European arrest warrant and are based on the law of the executing Member State, in cases where the final decision on surrender has been adopted by the executing judicial authority in accordance with Article 15(1) of that framework decision.

1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, as a preventive measure for the purposes of combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data. However, that Article 15(1), read in the light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not preclude legislative measures that provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for

– the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

– the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

– the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems; and

– recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.

2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which the centralised processing of requests for access to data, which have been retained by providers of electronic communications services, issued by the police in the context of the investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences, is the responsibility of a police officer, who is assisted by a unit established within the police service which has a degree of autonomy in the exercise of its duties, and whose decisions may subsequently be subject to judicial review.

3. EU law must be interpreted as precluding a national court from limiting the temporal effects of a declaration of invalidity which it is bound to make, under national law, with respect to national legislation imposing on providers of electronic communications services the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data, owing to the incompatibility of that legislation with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The admissibility of evidence obtained by means of such retention is, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, a matter for national law, subject to compliance, inter alia, with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

Lenaerts

Arabadjiev

Prechal

Rodin

Jarukaitis

Jääskinen

von Danwitz

Safjan

Biltgen

Xuereb

Piçarra

Rossi

Kumin

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 5 April 2022.

A. Calot Escobar

Registrar

K. Lenaerts

President

1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that permits public authorities to have access to a set of traffic or location data, that are liable to provide information regarding the communications made by a user of a means of electronic communication or regarding the location of the terminal equipment which he or she uses and to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning his or her private life, for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, without such access being confined to procedures and proceedings to combat serious crime or prevent serious threats to public security, and that is so regardless of the length of the period in respect of which access to those data is sought and the quantity or nature of the data available in respect of such a period.

2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that confers upon the public prosecutor's office, whose task is to direct the criminal pre-trial procedure and to bring, where appropriate, the public prosecution in subsequent proceedings, the power to authorise access of a public authority to traffic and location data for the purposes of a criminal investigation.

National legislation that lets a State authority require providers of electronic communications services to send traffic data and location data to the security and intelligence agencies for safeguarding national security falls within the scope of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Article 4(2) TEU.

National legislation cannot allow a State authority to require providers of electronic communications services to make a general and indiscriminate transmission of traffic and location data to the security and intelligence agencies, even for safeguarding national security.

1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, for the purposes laid down in Article 15(1), provide, as a preventive measure, for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data. By contrast, Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not preclude legislative measures that:

- allow, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain, generally and indiscriminately, traffic and location data in situations where the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, where the decision imposing such an instruction is subject to effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that one of those situations exists and that the conditions and safeguards which must be laid down are observed, and where that instruction may be given only for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended if that threat persists;

- provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

- provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an Internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

- provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating crime and safeguarding public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems;

- allow, for the purposes of combating serious crime and, a fortiori, safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.

2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as not precluding national rules which requires providers of electronic communications services to have recourse, first, to the automated analysis and real-time collection, inter alia, of traffic and location data and, second, to the real-time collection of technical data concerning the location of the terminal equipment used, where:

- recourse to automated analysis is limited to situations in which a Member State is facing a serious threat to national security which is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, and where recourse to such analysis may be the subject of an effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that a situation justifying that measure exists and that the conditions and safeguards that must be laid down are observed; and where

- recourse to the real-time collection of traffic and location data is limited to persons in respect of whom there is a valid reason to suspect that they are involved in one way or another in terrorist activities and is subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding in order to ensure that such real-time collection is authorised only within the limits of what is strictly necessary. In cases of duly justified urgency, the review must take place within a short time.

4. A national court may not apply a provision of national law empowering it to limit the temporal effects of a declaration of illegality, which it is bound to make under that law, in respect of national legislation imposing on providers of electronic communications services - with a view to, inter alia, safeguarding national security and combating crime - an obligation requiring the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data that is incompatible with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 15(1), interpreted in the light of the principle of effectiveness, requires national criminal courts to disregard information and evidence obtained by means of the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data in breach of EU law, in the context of criminal proceedings against persons suspected of having committed criminal offences, where those persons are not in a position to comment effectively on that information and that evidence and they pertain to a field of which the judges have no knowledge and are likely to have a preponderant influence on the findings of fact.

Access by public authorities to data identifying the owners of SIM cards activated with a stolen mobile telephone — such as surnames, forenames and, if need be, addresses — interferes with the fundamental rights protected by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, but that interference is not serious enough to require, in the field of preventing, investigating, detecting and prosecuting criminal offences, that such access be limited to fighting serious crime.

When the executing judicial authority has material, including material such as a reasoned proposal by the European Commission under Article 7(1) TEU, indicating a real risk of breach of the right to a fair trial because of systemic or generalised deficiencies affecting the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, it must make a specific and precise assessment of the requested person’s individual risk. It must decide whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would run that risk if surrendered, having regard to that person’s personal situation, the nature of the offence, the factual context underlying the European arrest warrant, and the information supplied by the issuing Member State under Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584.

The executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant where the person concerned did not appear in person in the relevant proceeding or proceedings for the purposes of Article 4a(1), and neither the standard European arrest warrant form nor the information obtained under Article 15(2) provides sufficient evidence that one of the situations in Article 4a(1)(a) to (d) exists. Even then, Framework Decision 2002/584 does not prevent that authority from taking account of all the circumstances of the case to ensure that the person's rights of defence were respected during the relevant proceeding or proceedings.

The executing and issuing judicial authorities remain obliged to agree on a new surrender date even if the time limits in Article 23 of Framework Decision 2002/584 have expired.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136 and read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, precludes national legislation that, for the purpose of fighting crime, requires the general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users for all means of electronic communication.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136 and read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, precludes national legislation on the protection and security of traffic and location data, and in particular on access by the competent national authorities to retained data, where all of the following apply: the objective of that access, in the context of fighting crime, is not limited solely to fighting serious crime; access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority; and the data concerned need not be retained within the European Union.

The executing judicial authority must refuse to give effect to a European arrest warrant that relies on an 'arrest warrant' within the meaning of Article 8(1)(c) but does not refer to any national arrest warrant, if — in light of the information provided under Article 15(2) and any other available information — it concludes that the European arrest warrant is not valid because it was issued without a national warrant separate from the European arrest warrant.

Even after the Article 17 time-limits have expired, the executing judicial authority must still decide whether to execute the European arrest warrant. Article 12, read with Article 17, does not preclude the requested person from remaining in custody under the law of the executing Member State, even if the total time in custody exceeds those time-limits — provided that the custody is not excessive in light of the characteristics of the procedure, which is for the national court to determine. If the executing judicial authority ends the requested person’s custody, it must attach to that person’s provisional release any measures it considers necessary to prevent absconding and to ensure that the conditions needed for effective surrender remain fulfilled until a final decision on execution of the European arrest warrant is taken.

For issuing and executing a European arrest warrant, the concept of "same acts" in Article 3(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584 is an autonomous concept of EU law. Where, in reply to a request under Article 15(2), the issuing judicial authority expressly states—applying its national law and complying with the requirements of that concept—that an earlier judgment in its legal system was not a final judgment covering the acts referred to in the arrest warrant and therefore did not bar the criminal proceedings referred to in that warrant, the executing judicial authority has no reason to apply the mandatory ground for non-execution in Article 3(2).