As EU law currently stands, it is for the Member States to decide whether the natural persons referred to in Article 2(1)(d) and (j) of Directive 68/151 may ask the authority responsible for keeping the relevant central, commercial or companies register to decide, case by case, whether it is exceptionally justified, on compelling legitimate grounds relating to their particular situation, to limit, after a sufficiently long period following the dissolution of the company concerned, access by third parties to personal data about them entered in that register to third parties that can demonstrate a specific interest in consulting that data.

A residence-permit applicant has a right of access to all personal data concerning him that are processed by national administrative authorities within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46. That right is satisfied if the applicant receives a full summary of those data in an intelligible form, i.e. a form that lets him know the data and check that they are accurate and processed in compliance with the directive so that he can exercise the rights it gives him.

Where the conditions in Article 12(b) and Article 14(a) are satisfied, a search engine operator must remove from the results shown after a search on a person's name links to third-party web pages containing information about that person. That applies even if the name or information is not erased from those web pages beforehand or at the same time, and even if publication on those pages is itself lawful.

When assessing whether Article 12(b) and Article 14(a) apply, it must be examined, among other things, whether the data subject is entitled, at this point in time, to have the information no longer linked to his name by the list of results shown after a search on his name. That right does not depend on the inclusion of the information in the list causing prejudice to the data subject. As a rule, the data subject's rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter override both the search engine operator's economic interest and the general public's interest in finding that information through a search on the data subject's name. But not where, for particular reasons such as the data subject's role in public life, the general public's preponderant interest in access to the information justifies the interference with those rights.

Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46 does not prevent a public authority from charging a fee for communicating personal data.

A fee charged when the right of access to personal data is exercised is excessive under Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46 if it exceeds the cost of communicating the data. It is for the national court to make the necessary checks in light of the circumstances of the case.

Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46 requires Member States to give data subjects a right of access to information on the recipients or categories of recipient of personal data and on the content of the data disclosed, for past disclosures as well as current ones. Member States must set the storage period for that information and the access to it so as to strike a fair balance between the data subject's interest in protecting privacy, in particular through the rights to object and to bring legal proceedings, and the burden on the controller of storing that information. A rule that limits storage of that information, and access to it, to one year while basic data are kept much longer does not strike that fair balance, unless longer storage would impose an excessive burden on the controller; that assessment is for the national courts.